Compared with traditional paper medical records, electronic medical records have many advantages such as easy transmission, high efficiency, better accuracy, and easier storage. The further development and penetration of electronic medical records will raise increasingly critical transmitted-data accuracy and security issues. Previous studies have proposed a verifier-based three-party authentication scheme and to provide high efficiency and security, with low computation and transmission costs. However, this protocol fails to achieve anonymity, is vulnerable to tracking attacks, and is inefficient. In this paper, we propose a new authentication scheme which provides patient anonymity and resistance to tracking attacks, while reducing computation and communication costs. The proposed system is easier to implement and is more suitable for use in remote electronic medical record exchange systems.
Introduction
Aging societies experience increasing rates of chronic disease (e.g., heart disease, diabetes, cardiovascular diseases, and mental health issues) which must be frequently observed and monitored. Patients with such illnesses require periodic hospital-or clinic-based checkups, which can be inconvenient and stressful for elderly people. The digitization of medical measurement equipment (e.g., blood pressure monitors, blood glucose meters) allows for diagnostic information to be stored electronically and transmitted to remote locations for analysis and monitoring, enabling patients to avoid hospital visits while enabling their health care to closely monitor their status. Such electronic medical records (EMR) [1] [2] [3] has many advantages over conventional paper medical records, such as easy transmission, high efficiency, better accuracy, and ease of storage. However, their increased convenience raises significant security issues such as patient privacy and data integrity.
Telecare medicine information systems (TMIS) [4] [5] [6] involve the transmission of remote digital medical information or health reports through the combination of computers, communication systems to provide patients, and medical institutions with a secure data transmission platform and allow them to obtain medical record or health reports securely and conveniently. However, there are many security issues such as patient privacy and data integrity. Many identification and authentication protocols have been proposed to protect patient privacy and information. TMIS with threeparty authentication is a secure data transmission platform that allows an authentication server and two participants (a medical institution or doctor and a patient) to generate a session key and a secure channel to verify their identities and then exchange data securely.
Lin and Lee [7] proposed a verifier-based three-party authentication scheme to provide high efficiency and security, along with low computation and transmission costs. However, this protocol fails to achieve anonymity and is vulnerable to tracking attacks. In addition, when authenticating a participant, it takes considerable time for the server to locate the verifiers, making the system difficult to implement. We thus propose a new authentication scheme which provides anonymity and resistance to tracking attacks, while reducing computation and communication costs. The proposed system is easier to implement and is more suitable for use in remote electronic medical record exchange systems. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews and analyzes verifier-based three-party authentication schemes without server public key including Lee et al. 's [8] , Wang-Mo's [9] , Kwon et al. 's [10] , and LinLee's [7] schemes. Section 3 introduces notations and security requirements for our scheme. Section 4 presents our proposed protocol, and the security analysis is given in Section 5. Section 6 provides a comparison of the proposed protocol and other related works. Finally, an implementation is described in Section 7 and a conclusion is drawn in Section 8.
Related Works
This section reviews four verifier-based three-party authentication schemes without server public key including Lee et al. 's [8] , Wang-Mo's [9] , Kwon et al. 's [10] , and Lin-Lee's [7] schemes and analyzes the weaknesses of their schemes. Lee et al. ' s Scheme. Lee et al. [8] proposed a verifier-based authentication scheme without server's public key based on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Their scheme enables each client to only remember a memorable password. The normal procedure of their scheme is shown in Figure 1 .
Review of

Initialization Phase.
A client and a trusted authentication server share a verifier V = mod for a password , and a client and share a verifiers V = mod for a password , where = ℎ( , , ) and = ℎ( , , ).
Verification
Phase. This phase allows and to share a secret key confidentially via . The details of the execution steps are described as follows ( Figure 1 ).
(1) → : , , : chooses a random number ∈ * , computes = mod , and sends , , to .
(2) → : , and → : , , , : chooses a random number ∈ * , computes = mod , and sends ( , ) and ( , , , ) to and , respectively.
(3)
→ : and → : : after receiving V and V , chooses two random numbers , ∈ * ,
= ( ) = mod , and = ( ) = mod , and sends and to and , respectively. Finally, possesses a session key = ( ) = mod and possesses a session key = ( ) = mod . Lee et al. ' s Scheme. Wang and Mo [9] showed that the Lee et al. 's scheme [8] is not resistant to an impersonation attack if an attacker once has stolen 's verifier V . However, Lin and Lee [7] showed that the Wang and Mo's scheme [9] do not realize key confirmation. If the transmitted EMRs or EHRs are encrypted by using an unconfirmed key, their integrity and confidentiality are unsure. Kwon et al. ' s Scheme. This section reviews Kwon et al. 's scheme [10] . The normal procedure of their scheme is shown in Figure 2 .
Weaknesses of
Review of
Initialization Phase.
and share a verifier V ,1 = mod and V ,2 = 2 mod for a password , and and share a verifiers V ,1 = mod and V ,2 = 2 mod for a password , where = ℎ( , , ) and = ℎ( , , ).
Verification
Phase. This phase allows and to share a secret key confidentially via . The details of the execution steps are described as follows ( [7] showed that the Kwon et al. 's scheme [10] do not realize key confirmation. If the transmitted EMRs or EHRs are encrypted by using an unconfirmed key, their integrity and confidentiality are unsure. Lin-Lee' s Scheme. This section reviews LinLee's scheme [7] (including the initialization and verification phases). The normal procedure of their scheme is shown in Figures 3 and 4 . and represent two medical institutions, and stands for a trusted authentication server.
Review of
Initialization Phase.
As shown in steps (1) in Figure 3 , and send their verifiers to via a secure and verified channel to register their verifiers. The details of the steps are as follows: sends verifier V = mod to , and sends verifier V = mod to , where = (ID , ID , ) and = (ID , ID , ).
Verification Phase.
Assume and need to exchange EMR or EHR confidentially via authentication server . As shown in steps (2), (3), and (4) in Figure 3 , and process a mutual authentication with and each other, perform a key agreement to obtain a session key, and exchange encrypted EMR or EHR encrypted by the session key. The details of the execution steps are described as follows:
( 
, and sends to .
mod , uses and to evaluate 
The procedure of Lin-Lee's scheme.
Weaknesses of Lin-Lee's Scheme.
We find Lin-Lee's scheme [7] has three drawbacks: (1) does not provide anonymity, (2) vulnerable to tracking attack, and (3) inefficiency.
(1) Does Not Provide Anonymity. Medical institution transmits data ID and ID to in the step (1) of verification phase, while medical institution transmits the same data (ID and ID ) to in the step (4) of verification phase. An attacker can obtain the identity (ID and ID ) of both and by eavesdropping on the transmission; thus the scheme does not provide anonymity.
(2) Vulnerable to Tracking Attack. The data ID and ID are transmitted in both step (1) and step (4) of verification phase. An adversary can track institutions and easily from the identity (ID and ID ); thus the scheme is vulnerable to tracking attack.
(3) Inefficiency. The scheme needs 16 exponentiations; therefore the computation cost of Lin-Lee's scheme is inefficiency.
Preliminary
Notations.
Notations section shows the notations used in our protocol, where SID = ℎ(ID , , ) is the pseudo ID of , is a data encrypted by using symmetric key encryption algorithm and sent to from , and , , and represent medical institutions , , or server .
Attacker Model.
In our scheme, we assume that the channels between and , and , and and are insecure. Any identity communicates with each other via an insecure public channel, offering adversaries opportunities to intercept. In the following, we present the assumptions of the attacker model [18] [19] [20] [21] .
(1) An adversary may eavesdrop on all communications between protocol actors over the public channel.
(2) An attacker can modify, delete, resend, and reroute the eavesdropped message.
(3) An attacker cannot be a legitimate server.
(4) The attacker knows the protocol description, which means the protocol is public.
Security Requirements.
The security requirements of our proposed scheme are listed as follows:
(1) Data integrity: an adversary cannot alter the transmitted data without being detected.
(2) Anonymity: an adversary cannot know the identities of medical institutions through the eavesdropped data. (3) Authenticity: any participant can authenticate other participants including the server.
(4) Medical record confidentiality: an adversary (including the server) cannot disclose any medical records.
(5) Medical record nonforgeability: an adversary cannot successfully forge electronic medical records.
(6) Resistance to asynchronous attacks: the system can process a successful authentication even if the data stored in participants' database may be asynchronous when a session cannot be normally completed.
(7) Resistance to tracking attack: an adversary cannot trace the medical institution or through the eavesdropped data.
Proposed Scheme
In this section, we propose a new three-party authentication scheme to achieve the functional requirements outlined in Definition 1 and the security goals outlined in Definition 2. The procedure of the proposed scheme is shown in Figure 5 .
Definition 1 (functional requirements of our scheme). Our scheme features three roles: medical institution , medical institution , and authentication server . Our scheme is functional if it provides that (1) , , and can authenticate each other; (2) and can obtain a common session key; (3) and can exchange electronic medical records; (4) is not required to have a public key; and (5) it is efficient to implement.
Definition 2 (security requirements of our scheme). Our scheme is secure if it achieves the following: (1) data integrity, (2) anonymity, (3) authenticity, (4) medical record confidentiality, (5) medical record nonforgeability, (6) resistance to asynchronous attacks, and (7) resistance to tracking attacks.
Initialization
Phase. This phase establishes the required parameters.
(1) The system chooses one large prime number . 
Verification
Phase. This phase presents the process of mutual authentication, key exchange, and data transmission among , , and .
Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze our protocol according to the security requirements defined in Section 3.3. The proof uses security reduction similar to that used in the random oracle model [22] . In other words, based on the security goal and attacker model, we prove that "if one claimed security property of our scheme is broken then one atomic primitive is broken," where the atomic primitive means some basic cryptographic algorithm or hard mathematical problem. Therefore, our scheme provides this claimed security property since the atomic primitive is assumed to be secure.
Data Integrity. If the transmitted data
is altered, postdecryption verification will fail, thus ensuring data integrity. Theorem 4 proves the property of data integrity from Definition 3.
Definition 3 (modified symmetric encryption problem). Let
, , ∈ , = ( , ), and = ( , ), where ̸ = .
If and can be evaluated from given and , then we say the modified symmetric encryption problem is solved (the probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr( , | , ) = 1 ). 
Theorem 4 (data integrity
Anonymity.
If the attacker wants to obtain ID or ID , he has to use SID or to evaluate them. However, ID cannot be evaluated from SID ← ℎ(ID , , ) because of the nonreversible one-way hash function. Moreover, evaluating ID requires decrypting = ( , ID , ) using the key , which is not obtained or evaluated through the eavesdropped data, therefore ensuring anonymity. Theorem 6 proves the property of data integrity from Definition 5.
Definition 5 (modified hash problem). Let , , ∈ , and = ℎ( , , ). If can be evaluated from given and , then we say the modified hash problem is solved (the probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr( | , ) = 2 ).
Theorem 6 (anonymity). In our scheme, if an administrator can obtain
from and , then the modified hash problem can be solved.
Proof. In our scheme, assume an adversary tries to evaluate ID from eavesdropped SID and . Let RO 2 be a random oracle: input and SID to output ID (i.e., RO 2 ( , SID ) ⇒ ID ). In Definition 5, let ← , and let ← and SID ← be input parameters of RO 2 and obtain output ID . Let ← ID ; then is evaluated. Therefore, Pr(ID | SID , ) ≤ Pr( | , ) = 2 , which means the modified hash problem can be solved if RO 2 exists.
Authenticity.
Authenticating a participant requires evaluating whether is equal to . Although an adversary can create a new or obtain through the eavesdropped data, he cannot obtain or to decrypt to achieve successful authentication, therefore ensuring authenticity. Theorem 8 proves the property of data integrity from Definition 7.
Definition 7 (joint modified symmetric encryption problem). Let , , , ∈ and = ( , , ), where = 1, 2, . . . , +1. If ( +1 , +1 ) can be evaluated from given and ( , ), then we say the joint modified symmetric encryption problem is solved, where = 1, 2, . . . , (the probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr( +1 , +1 | , , ) = 3 ). and +1 ← ( +1) , and then ( +1 , +1 ) are evaluated.
Theorem 8 (authenticity
+1 | , , ) = 3 , which means the joint modified symmetric encryption problem can be solved if RO 3 exists.
Medical Record Confidentiality.
Obtaining medical records requires using the session key (or ) to decrypt (or ), where the session key is generated from one's own private key (or ) and the public key (or ) of the opposite side. An attacker can neither evaluate the private keys or , nor obtain the public keys or due to anonymity. Therefore, the scheme ensures medical record confidentiality. Theorem 10 proves the property of data integrity from Definition 9.
Definition 9 (second modified symmetric problem). Let
, ∈ , and = ( , ). If can be evaluated from given and , then we say the second modified symmetric problem is solved (the probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr( | , ) = 4 ). = + 2). If an attacker wants to forge a medical record Data (or Data ), he/she has to evaluate the session key (or ) to encrypt both Data and + 3 (or both Data and + 2). Since the attacker cannot evaluate the session key, our scheme provides medical record nonforgeability. Theorem 12 proves the property of data integrity from Definition 11.
Theorem 10 (medical record confidentiality
Definition 11 (second joint modified symmetric encryption problem). Let , ∈ and = ( , ), = 1, 2, . . . , +1. If +1 can be evaluated from given +1 and ( , ), = 1, 2, . . . , , then we say the second joint modified symmetric encryption problem is solved (the probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr( +1 | ( , ), +1 ) = 5 ).
Theorem 12 (medical record nonforgeability). In our scheme, if can be modified successfully, then the second joint modified symmetric encryption problem can be solved.
Proof. In our scheme, assume an adversary tries to forge ( +1) from ( +1) and eavesdropped ( ( ) , ( ) ), = 1, 2, . . . , . Let RO 5 be a random oracle: input ( +1) and
( ) ← and ( +1) ← +1 − 2 be input parameters of RO 5 and obtain
, which means the second joint modified symmetric encryption problem can be solved if RO 5 exists.
Resistance to Asynchronous Attacks.
If an attacker wants to block a communication to make an asynchronous attack, he/she can use the following methods to cause A and S to update SID asynchronously, causing the system fail in the future.
(A) Blocking → : , , SID : if does not receive the data sent from , does not update SID and BSID , nor does update SID . Therefore, an asynchronous attack based on this blocking method will fail. (B) Blocking → : : if does not receive the data sent from , will not update SID . In the next authentication session, will use BSID to determine the information of ID . Therefore, this blocking method is resisted. Wang-Mo's scheme [9] Kwon et al. 's scheme [10] Lin-Lee's scheme [7] Our Wang-Mo's scheme [9] Kwon et al. 's scheme [10] Lin-Lee's scheme [7] Our scheme 
Resistance to Tracking Attack. Since SID ← ℎ(ID ,
, ) changes in each round and the relationship between the previous and current SID and cannot be found, where = or , the scheme is resistant to tracking attacks. Theorem 14 proves the property of data integrity from Definition 13.
Definition 13 (modified hash problem). Let , , ∈ , = ℎ( , , ), = 1, 2. If Equal( 1 , 2 ) can be evaluated from given 1 , 2 , 1 , and 2 , then we say the modified hash problem is solved, where Equal( , ) = {1, if = ; 0, otherwise} (the probability of solving this problem is denoted as Pr(Equal( 1 , 2 ) | 1 , 2 , 1 , 2 ) = 6 ). 
, which means the modified hash problem can be solved if RO 6 exists.
Comparison
This section compares the performance of our proposed method with previous verifier-based three-party authentication and key agreement (3PAKA) protocols without server public keys in terms of two aspects: computation and communication loadings (as shown in Table 1 ) and system properties (as shown in Table 2 ). From Table 1 , our scheme is superior to previous schemes in terms of computation and communication performance. Table 2 shows that, unlike other schemes, our proposed scheme provides anonymity and resistance to tracking attacks. Therefore, our scheme is superior to previous schemes in terms of security.
Moreover, in Tables 3 and 4 , we compare our proposed method with previous RSA-based 3PAKA schemes in terms of computation and communication loadings and system properties. Our protocol is a secure scheme providing 3PAKA and data exchange in medical environment, and the computation and communication loadings for providing only 3PAKA (without data exchange) in our scheme are different (lesser). In Table 4 Tso's scheme [12] Farash and Attari's scheme [13] Deebak et al. 's scheme [14] Our scheme E x p o n e n t i a t i o n [14] , each IP multimedia system (IMS) client enters his/her credentials into the registration form to avail the multimedia services, like video, voice, and data, and subsequently, the IMS server executes some steps to verify whether the client authorization is success or not. Moreover, each client has to perform two hash and two XOR functions in the logon phase, and the server has to perform four inverse computations in the authentication phase. Furthermore, we also compare our proposed method with other recently published 3PAKA schemes in terms of computation and communication loadings (Table 5 ) and system properties ( Table 6 ). The schemes [15, 16] are smart card based schemes and some of their security and efficiency are based on smart cards. The properties "resistance to verifier-stolen attacks" of the schemes [11] [12] [13] 17] are all "N/A" because they are password-based schemes without verifiers. From Tables 3-6, our scheme is superior to previous RSA-based and other recently published 3PAKA schemes in terms of security and computation and communication performance.
Implementation
This section presents the implementation of our scheme in mobile phones (Android 4.1) and PCs (Windows 7). The mobile system is implemented on Google Nexus S with a 1 GHz processor and 512 MB RAM. The PC implementation used Windows 7 Professional with an Intel (R) core (TM) CPU i5-650 @3.2 Hz and 4 GB RAM. The server (Server 1) and the user (Server 2) are implemented on Windows 7, while the user (Telecare) is implemented on Android. The hash function used is SHA-256 [23] and the symmetric encryption algorithm is AES [24] . Figure 6 shows the scheme flow in terms of data transmission and Figure 7 shows the data transfer renderings. In our implementation, we assume that the system times of the server and the users and are synchronized. However, their system times are difficult to be synchronized. Fortunately, the experience in implementation shows that the system time difference between the server and the users is within miniseconds. By assuming the maximum system time difference between the clients and the server is 1000 miniseconds and the values ( ) − and ( ) − are between 10 ms and 30 ms, we suggest to set th 1 and th 2 to −990 ms and 1030 ms, respectively (in real situation, the values ( ) − and ( ) − are suggested to be measured again for much accuracy).
Conclusion
In this paper, we review Lin-Lee's protocol and demonstrate its lack of anonymity and resistance to tracking attacks. We propose an enhanced three-party authentication scheme for use in telecare medicine information systems, which provides high standards of security issues and performance. The proposed scheme does not need server public keys, reduces computation costs, and resolves two significant security issues (anonymity and resistance to tracking attacks). Comparisons with other approaches show the proposed scheme provides improved security while incurring computational, communication, and transaction costs comparable to other methods. Privatekeysof and , :
Public keys of and :
As y m m e tri ck eyo f , : Section keys between and :
Encrypteddatafrom to ℎ(⋅):
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